RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT IN THE YANGTZE BASIN >> 2006, Vol. 15 >> Issue (4): 465-469.
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LI Chang-jie1,WANG Xian-jia1,FAN Wen-tao2,ZHENG Xu-rong3
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Abstract: The transaction model of water rights is the core in theoretical and practical study of water market. Based on the market norm of double auction, this paper analysed the characteristics of double auction in water rights market, and established the Bayesian model in incomplete information of water rights double tradeoffs. A mechanism design of water rights double auction was given and its effectiveness and incentive compatibility proved. Lastly, the implementation of the model was given.
Key words: water rights transaction, double auction, Bayesian model, mechanism design, incentive compatible
LI Chang-jie,WANG Xian-jia,FAN Wen-tao,ZHENG Xu-rong. DOUBLE AUCTION BAYESIAN MODEL AND DESIGN OF MECHANISM IN WATER RIGHTS MARKET[J].RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT IN THE YANGTZE BASIN, 2006, 15(4): 465-469.
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