Abstract: Abstract：Based on the survey data of Hubei Province in 2017, the article estimates the policy guidelines represented by government support and government supervision, and the informal institutions represented by peer mutual assistance and village supervision to influence the investment willingness of large-scale aquaculture professionals. The Lasso model was used to further screen the variables to improve the explanatory power of the model and to test the robustness. The results show that for the binding system, whether the government supervision or the village supervision is not conducive to the promotion of the investment willingness of large-scale aquaculture professionals, and for the incentive system, the mutual assistance between the breeding peers can significantly enhance their willingness to invest in environmental governance. This conclusion coincides with the policy change of China’s rural environmental governance from “who pollutes, who pays” to “who benefits, who pays”, emphasizing the important role of incentives in environmental governance, while highlighting the importance of peer communication and peer interaction in the cultivation of environmental governance consciousness.