长江流域资源与环境 >> 2006, Vol. 15 >> Issue (6): 718-718.

• 自然资源 • 上一篇    下一篇

城乡生态经济交错区农地城市流转决策博弈研究

黄烈佳   

  • 收稿日期:2005-11-28 修回日期:2006-02-05 出版日期:2006-11-20

DECISIONMAKING OF LAND CONVERSION AT THE 

HUANG Liejia   

  • Received:2005-11-28 Revised:2006-02-05 Online:2006-11-20

摘要:

在城市化过程中,城乡生态经济交错区的农地被占用是一种普遍现象。在我国,农地城市流转是通过土地征用而实现的,即我国农地城市流转决策属于政府行为,因此,从决策主体行为出发,研究农地城市流转,对于我国城市化的正常推进以及农地的有效保护具有重要的现实意义。研究得出,在现有的制度安排下,地方政府更加注重区域农地流转的经济发展,村干部往往是政策的执行者,而农民在决策中往往处于弱势地位,对于农地流转决策影响不大。可见,要控制农地过量向城市流转,必须树立科学的发展观,完善决策机制,规范征地行为,提高农民参与权。

关键词: 城乡生态经济交错区, 农地城市流转决策, 博弈

Abstract:

Land conversion from rural to urban has become a common phenomenon in the process of urbanization. Decisionmaking of land conversion is a governmental behavior, so, this paper studied mainly the land conversion in consideration of decisionmaker's behavior. In the current situation, local governors considered more about the importance of higher economic growth in a region, and village authorities executed the decision of local government, while the peasants' decision was ignored. To control land conversion from rural to urban, some countermeasures such as establishing the scientific viewpoint of development are suggested in this paper in order to control the loss of farmland.

Key words: urbanrural economic fringe, decisionmaking of land conversion, game

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