长江流域资源与环境 >> 2018, Vol. 27 >> Issue (05): 988-.doi: 10.11870/cjlyzyyhj201805006

• 区域可持续发展 • 上一篇    下一篇

资本下乡过程中农地流转风险识别、形成机理与管控策略

陈  振1,郭  杰1,2*,欧名豪1,2,费罗成3,程久苗3   

  1. ( 1.南京农业大学土地管理学院,江苏 南京 210095;2.农村土地资源利用与整治国家地方联合工程研究中心,江苏 南京 210095;3.安徽师范大学地理与旅游学院,安徽 芜湖 241000)
  • 出版日期:2018-05-20

Risk Identification, Formation Mechanism and Control Strategy of Farmland Circulation in the Process of Capital to the Countryside

CHEN Zhen1, GUO Jie1,2,OU Ming-hao1,2, FEI Luo-cheng3, CHENG Jiu-miao3   

  1. (1. College of Land Management, Nanjing Agricultural University, Nanjing 210095, China; 2.Center of Urban-rural Joint Development and Land Management Innovation, Nanjing 210095, China; 3. College of Geography and Tourism,Anhui Normal University,Wuhu 241000,China)
  • Online:2018-05-20

摘要: 资本下乡介入农地流转可以实现农村地区人、地、资本的协调发展,但同时也可能引发复杂多样的风险问题,已经成为农村经济社会转型的两难选择。为此,运用归纳演绎法和风险系统分析法,系统剖析了资本下乡过程中农地流转风险及其形成机理。研究结果表明:资本下乡过程中农户农地流转风险可以分为土地权益风险、社会保障风险和土地利用风险3个方面;风险受体为农户、社会经济子系统和土地生态子系统;风险源存在流转阶段差异,约定阶段风险源包括产权边界不清、制度规则模糊、信息不对称、激励政策不合理、政策执行主体能力偏低和准入机制缺失,执行阶段风险源为监管机制缺失和配套措施不完善;各类风险源通过“聚合反应”释放“产权公共领域”、“行为空间”、“合谋”、“选择行为”及“负外部性”等逆境胁迫因子作用于风险受体,引发各类流转风险。因此,通过一系列措施避免产权处于“公共领域”、缩小强势集团“行为空间”、防止权力与资本走向“合谋”、防范利益集团“选择行为”、降低流转“负外部性”可以有效管控资本下乡介入农地流转过程中的各类风险。研究成果可以为引导农地有序流转、保护农民合法权益、促进农村经济社会转型提供参考。
关键词: 资本下乡;农地流转风险;风险管理

Abstract: Capitals flowing to the countryside and involving in the farmland tranafer could facilitate the harmonious development of people, lands and capitals in rural areas; but it also might incur a series of complex problems and risks, which becomes a dilemma in the transitional period of economical and social development in rural areas. This essay, by employing methods of induction and deduction, and risk systematic anaysis, has analyzed the farmland transfer risks and their causes in the process of capitals flowing to the countryside. The research shows that the farmland transfer risks rising in such a process can be categorized into three types: risk in land rights and interests, risk in social security, and risk in land utilization; the risk recipients are peasants, social economical subsystems, and land eco-subsystems. The risk sources are different in different stages in the transfer process: in the agreement stage the sources include vague boundary of property rights, fuzzy policy and regulation, information asymmetry, unreasoable incentive policies, low ability of policy implemeters, and lack of access mechanism; risk sources in the executing stage are lack of supervisory mechanism and defective supporting facilities. Through polyreaction, all these risk sources may release adversity-stresses such as “Public domain of property right”, “behavior space”, “conspiracy”, “choice behavior”, and “negative externality” which affect risk recipients and incur various transfer risks. Thus, risks in the process of farmland transfer could be effectively managed if diverse methods are employed to prevent property rights from entering the public territory, to reduce the powerful group’s behavior space, to avoid the conspiracy between power and capitals, to be precautionary about the interest group’s choice behavior, and to minimize the negative externality in transfer. The research results will provide reference to the actions of making an orderly farmland transfer, protecting peasants’ rights and interests, as well as motivating the social economical transition in rural areas.
Key words:capital to the countryside; farmland circulation risk; risk management

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