Abstract: Building an environmental collaborative governance system involving multiple subjects is a significant measure to promote Chinese-style modernization. This paper constructed a dynamic evolutionary game model of "government-enterprise-public", based on perspective of prospect theory. This study analyzed the strategy selection and decision-making mechanisms of multi-subjects in environmental governance. Through numerical simulation experiments using MATLAB software, this paper revealed how factors such as the initial intentions of the players, the intensity of rewards and punishments, risk preference coefficients, and loss aversion coefficients affected the effectiveness of environmental collaborative governance. These findings indicated that:（1）The decision-making behavior of game players was influenced by their own and others' strategy selection and reached an equilibrium state under certain conditions.（2）Although the initial intentions of game players and the strength of governmental rewards and punishments affected the speed of system evolution, these factors did not change the final strategy selection, and the system evolved stably towards an ideal state.（3）The coefficients of risk preference and loss aversion in the perceived utility function significantly affected stable strategies in system evolution, which enhanced game players' perception of the value of rewards. Punishments were crucial for achieving optimal equilibrium.