Abstract: Pollution control is an important means to achieve high-quality development of the Yellow River basin，and the policy uncertainty caused by the dynamic game among the limited rational participants under the central government's policy adjustment is the key factor to understand the pollution phenomenon in the Yellow River basin. This paper combines evolutionary game theory with prospect theory,constructs an evolutionary game model among of the central government, local government and polluting enterprises, and explores the effective policy tools for coordinated pollution control in the Yellow River basin under policy uncertainty, and analyze the influence of various parameters on the direction and speed of the evolution of collaborative pollution control. The results indicate that:(1) Intensifying the participants’ perceived value of uncooperative action strategy, and reducing the the participants’ perceived value of cooperative action strategy are a effective way for the system to converge to the optimal evolutionary;(2) The problem of pollution control can be effectively mitigated by improving the cognition degree of local government and polluting enterprises on uncooperative action risk;(3)Improving the awareness of the consequences of local governments and enterprises choosing “weak” actions and enhancing the risk awareness of game players can effectively curb environmental pollution; (4) Under Chinese decentralization, ecological performance appraisal is an important mechanism for improving China’s environmental quality, but it must be based on a perfect screening mechanism and sufficient incentives.